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Western (European and North-Ameri-
can) constructions of the West tend 
to identify human rights, democracy, 
and freedom as key Western values. 
Were we to take these premises to 
be the characteristics of the West, we 
would find that the West is highly ap-
preciated throughout the Arab and 
wider Muslim world: recent opinion 
polls have shown that the majority of 
respondents from Morocco to Indo-
nesia also value human rights, prefer 
democracy to dictatorship, and favour freedom over repression.1 
It is clear that there is something spurious in the above postulation. 
The mistake lies not so much in the opinion polls, as much as it lies 
in the premise: while Western publics may generally identify the West 
with human rights and other lofty ideals, “non-Western” publics may 
hold different opinions. To further investigate this difference of opin-
ion we could again turn to opinion polls, yet for a more thorough un-
derstanding of the ideological meaning of the West in the country of 
my particular interest—Egypt—I will zoom in on the public debate as 
shaped by popular intellectuals of various ideological trends. 
The intellectual landscape in the Arab world today resists a straight-
forward categorization. The long established lack of political and press 
freedoms smothers the display of intellectual debates which otherwise 
could be monitored freely. A conventional division employed both 
within and outside the Arab world is between “Islamist” and “secular” 
discourses. Others have opted for a more comprehensive categoriza-
tion comprising Islamic, Marxist/leftwing, nationalist, and liberal intel-
lectuals trends.2 In this contribution I discuss three recent publications 
of authors belonging to various trends. Galal Amin, Muhammad Imara, 
and Rida Hilal are all prolific authors of 
carefully published books, and have 
been regular contributors to the coun-
try’s major newspapers for at least a 
decade. While the economist Galal 
Amin and the jurist Muhammad Imara 
continue to be quite productive, the 
journalist Rida Hilal has not been heard 
of since he mysteriously disappeared 
in August 2003. The three publica-
tions fall loosely within certain broad 
trends: “left-wing nationalist,” “Islamic,” 
and “liberal” respectively. The following exposé highlights a number of 
common strategies in Arab appreciations and representations of Eu-
rope and the West. I argue that the way in which the West is portrayed 
is to a large extent determined by ideology, and that none of the three 
ideological trends hold the West to be unequivocally identifiable with 
the aforementioned lofty ideals. 
Galal Amin: unabated Western imperialism
In 2002 the first Arab Human Development Report was published. This 
UNDP-sponsored report, drafted by a team of prominent Arab scholars 
and intellectuals, described with great candour the major problems in 
the contemporary Arab world. While the report was praised by many, 
some vehemently opposed the report for serving Western interests. 
Rather than elaborating on what was wrong with the Arab world, the 
authors had better focused on the oppressive role of external actors. 
One of the more prominent Arab intellectuals to attack the Report 
was the Egyptian economist Galal Amin of the American University in 
Cairo. To Amin, the Report almost constituted treason, since it played 
perfectly in the hands of the West. Amin was not alone in this assess-
ment. Various nationalist and leftist 
newspapers and intellectuals criticized 
the report for the same reason. In one 
of Amin’s recent publications we can 
see how strongly he feels about the 
importance of the West, and how he 
identifies it as an imperialist entity. In 
“The Era of Arab- and Muslim-bashing: 
We and the World after September 11,“3 
Amin argues that the Arab and Muslim 
world is suffering from a global smear 
campaign. For instance, the “events” 
of September 11 are thought by many 
to have been organized by Muslims, 
while in reality this was not the case. 
Amin does not elaborate as to who 
was behind the attacks if not Al-Qaeda, 
though he hints at the likelihood of an 
“inside-job.” His main aim however, lies 
in alerting Arabs and Muslims to the 
smear campaign against them and “re-
minding them of the justness of their 
case.”4 In The Era of Muslim-bashing, 
Amin rejects everything that does not 
fit the image of a noble, well-to-do 
Arab world. To him, the images of plun-
Gradually, the term “occidentalism” is gaining 
ground. Since the end of the Cold War and 
the consequent loss of a West that could be 
defined in terms of (and against) its Communist 
nemesis in the East, the process of imaging the 
West is steadily acquiring students. This article 
reviews how popular writers in Egypt imagine 
the West, showing that while their views on 
the West are shaped differently by particular 
ideologies, they converge in condemning the 
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der in Baghdad that followed the American invasion must have been 
part of the greater ploy to defame Arabs, for the footage of looting 
Iraqis fitted the profile of the “barbaric Arab” all too well. The image of 
the West as presented by Amin remains rather vague, which is perhaps 
necessary if it is to be blamed for the wide range of wrongs in the world 
that Amin perceives. Perhaps unsurprisingly, since he is an economist, 
the West is defined by Amin primarily in economic terms: capitalism 
and imperialism are the hallmarks of the West. The end of the Cold War 
has left the world with a new situation, Amin argues, in which capital-
ism has re-emerged in its original, crude form. While during the Cold 
War capitalism was diluted, our present era is characterized by the kind 
of capitalism that was prevalent when Karl Marx lived.5 Amin is far from 
alone in levelling his critique against the West in economic terms. With 
the demise of the Soviet Union and the communist alternative to lib-
eral capitalism it would seem that capitalism is no longer ideologically 
challenged and that, thus, anti-Westernism is a mainly culturally in-
formed antagonism. But Amin and other leftwing Egyptians show the 
continued relevance of ideologically informed economic criticisms of 
the “capitalist West.” 
Muhammad Imara: incompatible civilizations
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to so-called “mod-
erate Islamists” or “Islamic reformers,” sometimes also referred to as Is-
lamists of “the middle way,” as distinguished from “fundamentalists.”6 
It has been suggested that this trend has emerged from within Islamic 
fundamentalism, and that contrary to their radical progenitor, the Is-
lamists of the middle way are willing and able to compete in a liberal 
democratic setting. Although some have challenged the description, 
Muhammad Imara is one of those Islamic thinkers commonly catego-
rized as “moderate Islamist” (in Arabic the word used is mu‘tadil, mean-
ing “balanced” rather than “moderate”). Through his various weekly col-
umns and appearances on television, he is an important contributor to 
Arab public opinion. In a recent publication he focuses on the relations 
between Islam and the West.7 Imara takes it as a matter of fact that the 
relations between the two have always been at best problematic, and 
at worst, bloody. Much like some Western authors who present Islam as 
a civilization that, since its inception, has opposed the West (or Europe, 
Christianity, or the “Judeo-Christian civilization”), Imara portrays the 
West as a civilization that has never really changed in its position to-
wards the Orient (or Islam, or the Arabs). The West, according to Imara, 
has always been imperialist: it oppressed “the Orient and the Oriental 
peoples for ten centuries, from Alexander the Great … to the seventh 
century [Byzantine emperor] Herakleos.”8 All this only ended, Imara ex-
plains, when Islam came on the scene and liberated the Orient from 
Western oppression. From that moment on, the West had been at odds 
with Islam. This historical narrative serves two purposes. Firstly, it pro-
vides the reader with an image of the West as imperialist per se. The 
West is imperialist simply because imperialism is what Western civiliza-
tion happens to produce. Secondly, and partly as a consequence of the 
first lesson, there is nothing Muslims can do to alter the bad image that 
the West has of Islam. The West has exercised its oppression over the 
Orient before Islam emerged, which is seen as proof that the West will 
be aggressive towards the Orient regardless of Islam. This point is made 
elsewhere in the book, when Imara again stresses that the West cam-
paigned against Islam long before 2001, and that clearly September 11 
cannot be seen as the justification for Western attacks upon Islam. Ima-
ra’s portrayal of the West is different from that of Amin in that Imara fo-
cuses more on the idea of a religious conflict, in which the West stands 
opposed to Islam as a revolutionary religion and as an alternative to 
Western secular political systems. Though Imara does have economic 
grievances against the West, he stresses the cultural and civilizational 
differences between the Western and the Islamic worlds. In this sense 
his discourse echoes Huntington’s theory of a “clash of civilizations” as 
well as Bernard Lewis’s representation of East-West relations as charac-
terized by perennial conflict.
Rida Hilal: the West’s double speak
While “the West” has conventionally denoted Europe and North 
America, ever since the end of World War II it is the United States that 
has commonly been viewed as its primary component. The liberal in-
tellectual Rida Hilal goes further and tends not to speak of the West 
or Westernization, but of America and Americanization. In his recent 
book Americanization and Islamization,9 Hilal calls for a marriage of 
Islam and democracy to take the place of the current situation in which 
rigid Salafi Islamization is coupled with American consumerism. Inter-
estingly, Hilal contrasts the current process of Americanization with the 
pre-World War II process of Europeanization. He argues that whereas 
the Arab world today is taking but the foam of America, leaving aside 
its true riches, i.e. its values, the previous age of Europeanization was 
much more constructive: “Egyptians took from the Europeans the rule 
of law, constitutionalism, parliament, journalism, theatre, and cin-
ema.”10 The result was that Egypt could vie with the most progressive 
of the world’s nations, and Cairo could face up to Paris or London. This 
so-called renaissance-period, Hilal argues, was eventually frustrated 
both by British imperialism and by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. 
This nostalgia for pre-revolutionary Egypt, when Cairo was known by 
many as “Paris along the Nile,” is common to many liberals in Egypt. A 
common understanding, not limited to liberals, is that Europe or the 
West in general contains certain highly commendable qualities with 
regard to governance and personal freedoms, but that Westerners be-
tray these qualities in their foreign policy towards the Arab and Muslim 
world. Hilal claims that for a solution to “the Middle Eastern crisis” to be 
reached it is merely necessary “that America should honour the Ameri-
can values, most prominently the value of democracy.”11 This is reminis-
cent of the way in which Arab nationalists from before WWII attacked 
European colonialism without rejecting the project of cultural and po-
litical Europeanization. As Hourani wrote of this disposition: “while the 
nationalists condemned British or French policy, the conclusion they 
drew was not that England or France were intrinsically bad but that 
they were being untrue to themselves.”12 
Policies emerging from the “real West” 
The study of occidentalism in Egypt yields images of the West as di-
verse as the various competing ideological trends among the Egyptian 
intelligentsia. There appears to be little agreement on the meaning of 
the West, especially when compared to the often-lamented uniformity 
and consistency of Western images of the “Orient.” The three authors 
disagree in particular about the background to detrimental Western 
foreign policy. While Amin views unwelcome policies as the logical 
outcome of a malicious economic philosophy dominant in the West, 
Imara sees the West acting according to a supposed deeply-rooted 
anti-Islamic nature. Hilal, however, believes the West is acting in a man-
ner unbecoming of its “real” values, and evokes the notion of an ideal, 
universally desired West. 
There are, however, also striking convergences 
in these occidentalisms. In all three accounts, the 
West is perceived to be of paramount importance 
for Egypt and the wider Arab world. While only 
Hilal seeks the solution to the region’s problems 
in an assertion of the “true West,” all three authors 
agree that the main source of the region’s prob-
lems lies in policies adopted by the “real West.” 
This distinction between the ideal and the actual 
may also help us to understand the discrepancy 
between Western self-identifications and the 
image of the West elsewhere in the world.
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